In his first phone call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi after assuming the presidency for a second time, Donald Trump wasted no time in pushing for increased weapons sales, urging India to expand its procurement of American-made security equipment. In a brief readout of the interaction, the White House said, “The President emphasized the importance of India increasing its procurement of American-made security equipment and moving toward a fair bilateral trading relationship.”
Nobody should surprised by this direct and transactional approach, reflecting as it does Trump’s hallmark style of ‘don’t waste time’ politics, prioritizing tangible outcomes over diplomatic niceties. While the aggressive opening stance might appear based on laying the groundwork for the next phase in what has been a relationship on a strong strategic uptick for two decades, it also underscores the importance of the India-US relationship when it comes to defence, positioning India as a key partner in Washington’s broader geopolitical calculus, particularly in countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
But Trump’s business-like approach certainly suggests that he values transactional transparency more than anything else, accords value to ‘deals’ rather than gestures. But why did he feel the need to specifically push weapons sales to India at a time when the India-US weapons sales pipeline is actually booming? India is now one of the largest non-NATO users of American military equipment, which includes C-17 Globemaster III and C-130J transport planes, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, CH-47F Chinook heavylift helicopters, MH-60 ‘Romeo’ naval helicopters, P-8I Poseidon long range survillance and anti-submarine aircraft, M777 ultra-light howitzer guns among much else. While India’s imports of U.S. military hardware has been on a steady uptick for nearly two decades, the pipeline itself is buzzing.
In October, the Biden Administration concluded a $3.8 billion sale of 31 MQ-9B SeaGuardian/Sky Guardian armed drones to India. Few remember that it was the first Trump Administration that actually gave India’s request wings. The previous Obama 2.0 administration had been reluctant to clear armed versions of Predator-type drones to India, offering unarmed/basic surveillance versions instead. It was Trump’s Department of State and Pentagon that paid attention to what India was seeking. The deal was finally concluded under President Biden, but credit for it coming to fruiting must go to the policy tailwinds provided by the first Trump Administration.
The question then is: was Trump simply reminding India that he doesn’t want to see it slacken on defence imports? Or are there specific items on the table that he wants to see cleared?
The biggest and most obvious ‘deal’ on the line is the Indian Air Force’s multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) contest, a quest to procure 114 fighters of a foreign type, buying a handful from the maker and building at least 100 at a brand new production facility in India. In theory the MRFA is a wide contest between a slew of fighters, most of which have competed in the past in the very similarly structured, but doomed, M-MRCA contest. That quest for 126 fighters collapsed spectacularly and ended with India buying 36 of the the winning type — the Dassault Rafale — directly from the maker’s factory in France. In reality, most see the MRFA as a toss-up between the Rafale and new entrant into the race, the Boeing F-15EX Eagle II. After years in tentative cold storage, the MRFA has recently been breathing real air, with reports earlier this month that India’s Defence Ministry was looking for a ‘transparent, non-controversial’ way to execute the contest. Livefist founder Shiv Aroor was in this podcast that discussed the MRFA in detail. The Defence Ministry also set up a committee recently to look into the IAF’s capacity shortalls and recommend an action plan. The committee could well prescribe full-speed-ahead on the MRFA.
As it happened, the MoD Committee was formed a few days before China showed off two so-called ‘sixth generation’ fighter prototypes, an event that more than illuminated a growing Indian vacuum in this future-ready aviation space. The Chinese fighter flaunt only added fire to a conversation that has been simmering in India for years. A conversation wondering where India’s fifth generation fighter, the AMCA is. Noise surrounding the AMCA was jarring enough for Russia to see sense in abruptly elbowing itself into the room and getting its proxies to float the suggestion that India should buy Su-57 stealth jets as a ‘stopgap’ before the AMCA comes on line. Russia, in fact, is so convinced that it may have a foot in the door with this suggestion, that it is said to be sending a Su-57 to the upcoming Aero India 2025 show next month in southern India, where the jet will doubtless have an enthralling flight display set. American F-35s, which debuted at the 2023 iteration of Aero India, are said to have pulled out of this year’s show after initially planning to take part. Either way, the last few months have provided ample grist to the suggestion that India may be under ‘pressure’ to consider the unthinkable option of importing stealth aircraft.
And if that were even an option on the table — and Livefist strongly believes it shouldn’t be — then its seems obvious that the F-35 would be Trump’s next project push with India.
None of this is to remotely suggest that India cannot or will not be pushing back on these possibilities aggressively. As things stand, India has the strongest possible reason not to be goaded by overt U.S. pitches of air power assets — the troubling delays in the delivery of American-built GE F404 fighter engines for Indian Tejas MK1A jets has turned things semi-sour for a trade pipeline that has been singing with early deliveries for two decades. How India can leverage these substantial delivery concerns with Trump’s urgency to move things forward in other areas will be an early challenge for the two countries.
The other ‘deal’ on the India-U.S. table is the ‘co-production’ of at least 100 Stryker armoured vehicles in India for the Indian Army as part of the Defence Trade & Technology Initiative (DTTI). You can listen to a detailed podcast on this deal here, where Aroor captures some of the reasons why this deal make no industrial or operational sense to the Indian security establishment, given that Indian firm Tata Defence has already delivered a comparable capability, the WhAP, in partnership with India’s Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO).
Experts that Livefist spoke to said it was unlikely that India would be winding down its defence-related imports from the United States, and in fact, things would likely move even more quickly. The experts almost unanimously suggested that since Trump’s full-blast approach is here to stay, it would be prudent for India to choose its imports wisely. Typically, experts recommend that India speed up the procurement of items that it doesn’t have comparable substitutes for in country. For instance, more of the P-8I, C-130J Super Hercules, CH-47F Chinook and MH-60R helicopters, while pushing back on others where India has built its own capability. A prospective reboot of the IAF’s long meandering quest for refueling tankers is another space where the Trump Administration could push hard. That defence deals will also be seen especially as credits in the far tougher trade/tariff negotiations between the two countries makes things even more delicate.
Another India-US project that is reported to be moving forward is the ISTAR battlefield and ground surveillance aircraft platform, which you can read about here.