Delays in the delivery of India’s Tejas Mk1A fighters, a flashpoint that hit newspaper front pages this month, has informed a vast public beyond the Indian Air Force, MoD planners and defence stakeholders, of a harsh truth that has been true for a long time: While India has come a long way in developing its own combat aircraft, it continues to wholly depend on foreign suppliers for the engines that power them. That’s why India has no choice but to sit around and wait for U.S. firm General Electric to deliver engines nearly a year later. In normal course, such a delay — the reasons are a topic debate and range from supply chain disruptions to the Biden Administration’s pressure tactics on India — but General Electric knows that India has no option but to stay the course with American engines or incur unacceptable delays and costs on its already late Tejas program.
But did India miss an opportunity over a decade ago to sort out the current mess?
India’s inability to develop an acceptably powerful domestic jet engine has left India totally reliant on American, Russian, and French engines, leaving India with bottlenecks like the current one, potential cost escalations going forward, and geopolitical vulnerabilities. India’s long-stalled Kaveri engine project highlights how India’s lack of domestic engine technology has forced its air force to import more aircraft than it probably would like, rather than fielding a truly self-reliant fighter fleet. Until India breaks this dependency and develops a competitive indigenous turbofan, its squadron strength will remain hostage to foreign approvals, diplomatic whims and supply chain constraints.
But did India fail to leverage its position as a colossal buyer of foreign equipment to solve its engine crisis?
Despite spending tens of billions on fighter aircraft from France—including the Mirage 2000, the Mirage upgrade program, the Rafale deal, and now a second upcoming Rafale deal for the Indian Navy—New Delhi has failed to secure much-needed turbofan engine technology. This, in Livefist’s view, represents a colossal failure of strategic foresight, as India had significant leverage over France, which was desperate to export the Rafale but failed to use it to end its engine dependence.
A History of Missed Leverage Opportunities
India first selected the Rafale in 2012 after an exhaustive Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition. At that point, France’s Dassault Aviation was struggling to secure export orders for the aircraft, having faced repeated setbacks in international competitions. India’s decision to procure 126 Rafales should have been contingent on technology transfers, particularly for the Safran M88 engine that powers the Rafale. A strategically negotiated deal could have required France to either share critical engine technology or establish a joint venture for indigenous engine production. Instead, India settled for offsets and some limited technology transfers while remaining entirely dependent on American General Electric (GE) engines for its indigenous fighter programs.
The Cost of Dependence on GE
India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk1 and Mk2, as well as the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), all rely on GE engines—the F404 and F414. This reliance exposes India to American export controls, sanctions risks, and geopolitical constraints that could jeopardize the availability of engines and spare parts in times of crisis. The AMCA, India’s most ambitious indigenous fighter project, is expected to use the GE F414 engine, further deepening dependence on American technology at a time when self-reliance should be the priority.
The French Desperation Factor
France, keen to secure India as a long-term Rafale customer, was in no position to refuse technology-sharing demands in 2012. Those who argue that a single commercial sale of fighters gives India no leverage to demand something as deeply proprietary and strategically valuable as turbofan engine technology are patently wrong. French defence industry had no other confirmed Rafale export orders at the time, making India’s procurement a crucial lifeline. Had India insisted on a turbofan engine joint venture then, France would have had strong incentives to agree. The deal could have involved co-developing an engine derived from the Snecma M88, modified to meet India’s fighter requirements, ensuring that future Tejas and AMCA variants had a fully indigenous powerplant. Instead, any proposed French participation in a joint engine was left ambiguous and at the mercy of nebulous new rules of engagement under the then nascent offsets policy. Therefore discussions got mired in the reeds of a bureaucracy and DRDO that simply didn’t understand what they were dealing with, resulting in no forward movement on engine tech an appalling 13 years later.
And how is France about to be rewarded for its share of the blame in a joint engine being a non-starter? With a colossal second deal for Rafale jets, which also involves no understanding on engine technology.
An agreement hammered out from a position of power which India was in would have mitigated the risk of further delays and cost overruns in India’s long-running Kaveri engine program. France already had experience working with India’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) through the proposed Safran-Kaveri tie-up, but without a strong push from the Indian government — and zero incentive for France to see the joint effort succeed — no technology was transferred, nor did any work even really happen.
A Lost Decade and an Uncertain Future
Had India leveraged its Rafale deal effectively in 2012 or later, it could have had a fully functional joint engine ready for the Tejas Mk2 and AMCA by now. Instead, India continues to negotiate with GE for the F414, with no clear pathway to self-sufficiency. Meanwhile, France has since sold Rafales to multiple nations, weakening India’s bargaining position in subsequent negotiations, including the upcoming deal for 26 Rafales for the Indian Navy.
India’s failure to demand engine technology transfer from France during its massive fighter aircraft procurements is therefore a strategic blunder. Despite spending tens of billions on French jets, New Delhi remains at the mercy of foreign suppliers for the most crucial component of fighter aircraft: the engine. The enormous leverage India had in 2012 has been squandered, and the country remains dependent on the goodwill of the U.S. for GE engines. Moving forward, India must ensure that any future fighter jet procurement mandates the transfer of cutting-edge engine technology, or it will continue to lag in its goal of true defence self-reliance.