A long meandering debate over whether India would build a second aircraft carrier to fulfil a 3 x aircraft carrier-based naval doctrine appears to have been quietly shelved with the navy sharpening its plans around nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) instead. The Indian Navy currently operates two aircraft carriers: INS Vikramaditya, a refurbished Russian vessel that was commissioned in 2013, and INS Vikrant, a homegrown carrier commissioned in 2022. The navy had thus far operated on the hope that it would acquire a second specimen of the Vikrant -class in order to execute an elegant three-carrier proposition, which would see India operate two aircraft carriers at any given time on its oceanic flanks or training, with the third in maintenance or refit.
A Hindustan Times report today quoted senior naval sources as emphasising that any second Vikrant class carrier (IAC-2) would replace INS Vikramaditya, and will not be a ‘third’ carrier as earlier planned. While the debate around carriers has been a polarising one within the military and Defence Ministry, apparent clarity around the carrier force expansion comes months after the Indian government green-flagged a long anticipated homegrown program to develop and build SSNs.
The decision is a good one, reflecting as it does a combination of an evolving naval doctrine, operational challenges, financial constraints and a maritime outlook that prioritizes undersea warfare over aircraft carrier-based power projection. Most importantly, the decision should open up resources, decision-making clarity and speed towards the SSN program, tentatively called Project 76.
Costs are a major factor at play. The high costs associated with aircraft carrier construction and maintenance, combined with long delays in commissioning new carriers, have made this approach unsustainable.
The Indian Navy had proposed building INS Vishal, a larger and more advanced CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier. However, this plan has not progressed due to budgetary and technological hurdles. The focus has now shifted to replacing INS Vikramaditya, rather than building a third carrier alongside it.
Maintaining an aircraft carrier fleet is expensive. The cost of refitting INS Vikramaditya alone has been estimated at ₹1,207 crore (about $145 million), and a full replacement of the ship will require several billion dollars. Additionally, aircraft carriers require extensive support infrastructure, including escort ships, submarines, and aircraft. This puts immense pressure on India’s defense budget, which must also accommodate major modernization projects in the Army and Air Force.
India’s experience with carrier operations has also been complicated by reliability issues with INS Vikramaditya and the MiG-29K fighters that operate from it. The complexity of carrier operations and a relative lack of synergy in training and maintenance between different carriers may have further complicated the Indian Navy’s ability to manage a three-carrier fleet.
The decision to throw everything at the SSN program signals a major doctrinal shift. Nuclear submarines provide greater stealth and endurance, making them more effective for power projection and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. Unlike aircraft carriers, SSNs are less vulnerable to anti-ship missiles and asymmetric threats such as drones and hypersonic weapons.
The green-lighting of India’s SSN project suggests that naval planners see submarines as a more cost-effective and survivable option for securing sea lanes and countering China’s expanding naval presence. This aligns with global trends where many modern navies are increasing their submarine fleets while reconsidering the viability of large aircraft carrier groups. With India commissioning its second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arighaat in August last year, there is confidence that the SSN program will build on the difficult gains made over decades on those programs.
Instead of committing to three aircraft carriers, India appears to be taking a more balanced approach—maintaining two carriers while increasing investments in submarines and other advanced naval assets. The Indian Navy has had to battle inadequate submarine force levels for years, and has only lately seen a degree of force accretion, with the induction of six locally built Scorpene/Kalavari class submarines, and the recent forward movement in the parallel Project 75-I, where Indian planners have decided to move ahead with Germany’s Thyssenkrupp.
What’s unclear is if this fresh carrier number clarity means that clearance for IAC-2’s construction is on the horizon. The likely retirement of INS Vikramaditya by 2035 means that time to build its replacement isn’t exactly in generous supply. While it is unlikely that India will explicitly confirm plan tweaks, this reported realignment at the very least indicates that the Indian Navy is prioritising undersea warfare and deterrence over traditional carrier-based naval power.
Unlike a carrier, which is a highly visible and resource-intensive platform, SSNs provide stealth, endurance, and operational flexibility, making them ideal for sea denial and deterrence. Given China’s expanding naval presence in the region, including its growing fleet of submarines and the establishment of overseas bases like in Djibouti, SSNs offer India a potent asymmetric countermeasure. They can operate undetected for extended durations, conduct surveillance, and interdict potential threats without the logistical vulnerabilities that a carrier battle group entails.
Moreover, the Indian Ocean is characterized by vast maritime spaces, numerous chokepoints, and a growing presence of extra-regional navies, making undersea warfare a crucial domain for maintaining strategic deterrence. While aircraft carriers serve power projection roles, they are also highly resource-intensive and vulnerable to modern anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats, such as China’s long-range anti-ship missiles. In contrast, SSNs can impose significant operational costs on adversaries without exposing India to similar risks. Given India’s finite defense budget and the pressing need to modernize its undersea fleet, prioritizing SSNs enhances India’s ability to secure its maritime interests effectively while ensuring a credible deterrent posture against both conventional and asymmetric threats in the Indian Ocean region.
As the geopolitical environment evolves, India’s naval doctrine will continue to adapt, favoring a mix of surface and subsurface capabilities to counter threats in the Indian Ocean and beyond.