Nearly four years after the Indian Army received clearance from the Ministry of Defence to sign up for 118 of the indigenous Arjun Mk.II main battle tank developed by the DRDO, an actual order remains acutely elusive. And it now emerges that the DRDO is virtually pleading with the Army to go ahead and place the order so it can accelerate the process of moving from tank prototype to mass production. The Army, though, says it has its reasons not to sign on the dotted line yet.
The Arjun Mk.II, an improved version of the Arjun (of which the Indian Army operates 124 tanks across two regiments), was meant to be the solution to the program’s singularly tough run of luck. Last year, Livefist reported on what was only the latest in a history of hurdles (do read for a fuller picture of the project’s troubled history) that had met the project, literally stopping it in its tracks. A new report in Parliament now throws fresh light on Project Arjun’s troubles — its capacity to fire missiles at other tanks.
While the Army is said to have approved 72 desired improvements in trials that lasted from July 2012-September 2015, the Arjun Mk.II hasn’t demonstrated the capability to fire anti-tank missiles satisfactorily yet. Troubles on this front started in 2013 when the chosen Israeli LAHAT weapon failed to meet acceptance test parameters (ATP) of the Army. The following year it was virtually dropped from consideration, with the DRDO deciding to develop an in-house anti-tank missile for the Arjun. It now turns out that the Israeli LAHAT may be back in consideration with assurances of an ‘improved’ version that can meet the Indian Army’s requirements.
The DRDO has notified Parliament that it is urging the Army to release a contractual order on the premise that the Arjun Mk.II will be production ready by 2021-22, and that the improved weapon can be retrofitted by that time. The Army isn’t enthused just yet, with sources saying they are waiting for a minimum basic missile capability demonstration before proceeding to place the order.
The re-entry of the Israeli LAHAT system into consideration is significant too and presents a dilemma to the DRDO. The LAHAT has had a shot with the Arjun and failed to perform satisfactorily, but the fact that it is still even being looked at suggests time pressures. The very fact that the DRDO itself is offering up the option of either an improved LAHAT or its own ATGM for the Arjun suggests it is wary of any further delays derailing a program that has already been postponed beyond measure and memory.
The DRDO has also officially informed Parliament that its tube-launched anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) for the Arjun Mk.II is among its sanctioned projects for the year 2017-18. The laser homing tube launched 120mm missile is expected to be ready for user trials in 2018-19.
Last year, Livefist reported on an unprecedented weight reduction exercise that had been ordered by the Army, throwing the Arjun Mk.II’s path to production plan out of gear. It was reported recently that the DRDO is fighting an expectedly losing battle on that front too.
Rachit Singh You are absolutely right when you raised the issue of demanding 4 crew Arjun but later buying 3 crew T90 which is highly inferior tank and wasn’t even taken by Russia’s own Army when India Army inducted it bulk spending Tax Prayers’ hard earned money !
The Government should allow the buyers – the IMPORTEOMANIAC Procurement Tsars NOTORIOUS for always demanding development of proverbial Blue Moon from India’s Defence R&D and Indian Industry but ending up inducting JUNK in bulk, to openly specifying…. Bonuses, Kickbacks, Commissions, Cuts, Foreign Junkets…. and so on, while seeking Weapons etc.
I dare the authorities to place in public domain:
1. Detailed results of comparative Trials of Arjun MBT MkI vs T90 ! Arjun MBT MKII is even far far superior.
2. Details of all the failures of various systems of T90 tanks and accuracy of its weapon systems in Indian conditions, including performance in Thar desert !
Do the “battle going SOLDIERs” the real Fighters, bound by Strict Army Discipline, have any worthwhile say in Procurements ???? The IMPORTEOMANIAC Procurement Tsars no longer have to face battles !
It is very simple to conclude if some officers are sitting over file either they dont know anything or want kickbacks from manufactures , which they obtain from foreign vendors but seldom get from indegeneous one. GOD only can save this country.
Please ask the users to name a single Battle Tank in the world that has all the features demanded in Arjun MBT MKII and is still SIGNIFICANTLY LIGHTER than Arjun MBT MKII ! It’s an open challenge !
Absolutely unfair, if true.
This attitude of army will mean they will never get any weapon.
I do hope they buy 500 Arjun tanks. This will create a viable support envirnoment .
They we can go,for next gen tank, hoping the RFQ is sensible.
I think its high time the IA was asked to become rational and get in synch with national aims and objectives. Sabotaging a national program for no clear reason is beyond stupidity.
What is wrong with them?
They have a T-90 which can’t shoot straight, cannot operate in high-temperatures and yet, they will fall through hoops rejecting indigenous equipment with flights of fancy.
Latest is asking specs for QRSAM beyond missiles they were purchasing from abroad.
This sort of silly decision making by IA must be stopped by MOD and a stern position taken
If the tank was inferior then why army sat over was order for four years without any decision. It is obvious from this that either army is confused or they want kickbacks to clear the dust from file. R & D is not over night phenomenon. Is not it is better to order some Arjun tank then ask them to upgrade the shortcomings for future variants.
Problem here is, our Armed forces especially the army outdated with mechanical resources and human resources too. These high rank officials never go into battlefield as like the low rank soldiers who actually fight. Need of the hour is to flush out those outdated brains and bribe mongering bad fellas. I have a suggestion for those who wants to join forces for money, just go to hell! But I do believe most personnel in forces are honest though.
Indian Army prefers everything imported else they are not confident.,
I don’t understand what’s the problem with the army it looks like either they are too confused or they are too obsessed with foreign weapons. I mean first they put a general qualitative requirements which are off the charts and when the Indigenous defence industry reaches anywhere near it the user which in this case is the army changes its requirements. Now if there’s one single issue with the Arjun mk2 that is its missile firing capability (other than that it’s an absolutely wonderful platform) and when drdo’s promissing that by the time the first batch of mk2’s will roll out of the factory they would have addressed the problem and retrofit the tanks, Now I seriously don’t understand why isn’t the army ordering it..
As long as India desperately tries to please Russia and western powers so that diplomatically Pakistan won’t gain a upper hand, till then Indian Government (not really the Army?) would discourage local makes!!…The day India buys more weapons locally, there is no incentive for Russia and others to side with India diplomatically and thereby Pakistan gains an upper hand. So in short, it is not just some bribes or mischief happening, it is diplomacy at work. I would recommend to DRDO not to make weapons which would hurt India’s foreign policy. For example make small arms, with the money you put for Arjun Tank, if it had been put to make assault rifles, we would have had the best rifle perhaps.
If you still want to make weapons locally and fully, then stop hating Pakistan and even perhaps Pakistan has to agree to this. After all it takes two to tango!!. After this, no arms lobby can come and say, hey we won’t side with you if you don’t buy arms from us.
Looks like Defence Ministry is in absolute tatters. They can’t seem to make a single decision right. Here in this case, Modi’s Defence Ministry seems to be utterly incompetent to book these bureaucrats who are sabotaging our indigenous defence technology development for bribes and kickbacks.
In other countries, they would simply induct the tank and let the company further develop the tank for firing missiles etc and then later upgrade it.
Indian Army and Indian AF top brass seem to be compromised at least the matter of ex-ACM Tyagi is there for everyone to see.
It is something like Indian army is using sticks and DRDO develops an assault rifle, and Indian army refuses to Induct the assault rifles because those cannot be used like sticks in combat.
Kickbacks is in Indian blood. Why don’t DRDO bribe the army?
Here come the armchair experts and Army-bashers, crawling out of the woodwork again.
I ask them this: Why is it that the Army, which has accepted a number of indigenous weapon systems, including but not limited to Brahmos, Pinaka, ALH and Prithvi, not too excited about the Arjun? Is it just possible, that the Arjun tank is a really poor piece of equipment, or maybe, not at all suitable to the Indian Army’s strategc and tactical requirements? Is it possible, that the only reason the Arjun has made it so far, is underhand tactics of the DRDO and the misguided zeal of ill-informed enthusiasts?
I see a lot of Army bashing coming from what seems like biased pro-DRDO/DRDO-funded lobby. More Army bashing is coming from armchair analysts acting on poor information and/or poor analysis. It is thus that I want to share my analysis, targeted at those who visit this site for facts. Hopefully the paragraphs below provides you information to help draw your own informed conclusions.
Allegation 1: The Army does not favour indigenous products:
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Incorrect. The Army has whole heatedly adopted a number of Indigenous weapon systems. The Rudra, ALH, Brahmos, Pinaka, Prithvi and multiple Radar systems are just a few of them. On the horizon are new ones like Dhanush and LCH. Arjun is one of the few examples of a locally developed system not finding complete acceptance.
Allegation 2: BFAT resolves all of Arjun’s mobility issues:
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Incorrect. BFAT address a single issue. It can carry a load of 61 tonnes and thus replaces older railway bogies which were incapable of transporting the Arjun. Arjun’s mobility issues are twofold:
– Arjun’s theatre of operation already excludes mountainous and marshy terrain, where its weight is a distinct disadvantage. Even in this limited theatre of operation (parts of Punjab and Rajasthan border), the Army is still stuck with Rail and Road infrastructure unsuitable for transporting Arjun. Problems include narrow/weak bridges, standard railway track separation which is too narrow to accommodate Arjun’s width and also non-metalled, narrow and winding roads unsuitable for tank transporters. A comprehensive rail and road upgrade program will be extremely expensive and even if money is found for the same, it would be decades before the infrastructure upgrade is complete.
– The German WW2 Blitzkrieg tactics, which forms the bible for modern tank warfare, calls for sharp, swifts and rapid movement of Armoured columns, **into enemy territory**. When War is going favourably, Armoured columns don’t suddenly stop on reaching the border. It is this infrastructure on the other side of the border, infrastructure that we have no influence over, that poses the biggest threat and will almost certainly halt the Arjun, and our Army’s advance, in enemy territory.
Allegation 3: The Army has constantly changed the specifications:
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Completely unreasonable allegation. Technology marches on. As an example, in the last 25 years the Car industry has seen the introduction of Airbags, electronic Stability Control, LED headlamps, GPS Navigation, Bluetooth Integration, dual clutch transmissions, On-Board Diagnostics, remote Tire Pressure Monitoring, reverse parking sensors, parking cameras, Hybrid cars and now Radar-Based Cruise Control and Electric Self driven cars.
It is this rapid advance in technology that has necessitated change and upgrades to keep weapon systems relevant. It is thus, that you have the F-16A/B, Block 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20, F-16C/D Block 25, 30/32, 40/42, 50/52 and many more versions, each version boasting of multiple major and minor improvements over the previous one. In the meantime, the DRDO having started way back in 1972, has struggled to deliver even the basics platform till quiet recently. If anything, the updated specifications, have attempted to keep Arjun relevant, something that shows the Army’s commitment to the platform.
Allegation 4: Comparative trials are being avoided by the Army:
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Incorrect. Not only have comparative trials been carried out by the Army, the Army’s leadership has been openly appreciative of Arjun’s superior accuracy and firepower. The problem is that the Arjun is unsuitable for our Army’s requirements. The Armoured corps, made up of approx. 2000+ T-72s and 2000 T-90s (including planned ones), is structured along Soviet approach to Armoured warfare, i.e. that of overwhelming enemy forces with sheer numbers. Officers and Soldiers have endlessly trained and honed these tactics for years and built infrastructure, systems, processes and contingency plans, centered on these tactics. Should that entire strategy be redefined, officers and soldiers retrained and supply chain reinvented, just so that Arjun can be made our MBT? While it is completely possible, and probably desirable, Modernization of the Army into being less manpower intensive and more technologically advanced force, is a long-term and expensive proposition, that needs to be tackled holistically and cannot be carried out in isolation, in the Armoured corps alone.
Conclusion:
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The DRDO has done a good job in turning Arjun into what it is. It has developed and proved multiple technologies. However, the process has taken far too long and the product, while capable in many areas, does not meet the Army requirements today, let alone the requirements of tomorrow. In light of Arjun’s capabilities, the Army has rightly committed itself to buying a limited number of Arjuns and found ways of optimally deploying the same. However, in light of the shortcomings, only some of which are listed above, it is highly irresponsible to commit more national resources (ie money) into buying more Arjuns. Perhaps the best possible way forward would be to use the lessons learnt and the technologies developed, into forming the basis of the next generation MBT.
Could the army please release a video of the T-90 hitting anything (other than the ground) with it’s tank launched missile?
You need to wake up in life…. seriously!!
Try being on the target end…. our gunners won’t miss your balls… if you have ’em.
Ignorance is bliss… enjoy while you can;… or join the Indian Army…. BUT keep shut… in any case.